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INTRODUCTION

Reparations claims growing out of the institution of slavery in the United
States can be framed in two ways: as claims for compensation for loss or as
claims for restitution of unjust gains. A number of commentators, as well as
lawyers filing claims in court, have viewed the claim for restitution as more
promising.'
Restitution avoids some of the conceptual difficulties and
problems of proof that affect claims to compensation for temporally distant
wrongs. 2 Restitution also appears, at first glance, to be more easily
reconcilable with the prevailing understanding that legal and moral rights and
3
duties belong to individuals rather than groups.
I shall argue that, despite an initial appearance of superior doctrinal fit,
restitution is not an appropriate vehicle for reparations claims based on slavery
and similar large-scale historical injustices. My argument is not that the law of
*

Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.

See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1042-44 (N.D.
Ill. 2004) (adjudicating reparations claims that relied, in large part, on unjust enrichment and

related claims to restitutionary relief); see also HANOCH DAGAN, THE FOURTH PILLAR: THE
LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 281-295 (forthcoming 2004) (suggesting that unjust
enrichment can guide analysis of, if not resolve, the question of slavery reparations);

Bernard Boxhill, The Morality of Reparation, in

REVERSE DISCRIMINATION

270, 275-77

(Barry R. Gross ed., 1977) (arguing for reparations on the basis of unjust enrichment); Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparationsfor Slavery and Other HistoricalInjustices, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 689, 700-01 (2003) (finding that restitution, as compared to compensation,
provides a stronger basis for reparations).
2 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 700-03 (asserting that "because the victim and
claimant do not need to be the same person ...the restitution argument provides a stronger
case for reparations than the compensation argument does").
3 See id. at 698-701 (comparing compensation and restitution as grounds for reparations
under a theory of "ethical individualism"). I suggest below that a reparations claim based
on unjust enrichment ultimately must rely on a group-oriented understanding of rights. See
infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.

1443
HeinOnline -- 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1443 2004

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

1444

[Vol. 84:1443

restitution fails to support reparations claims, although that may well be the
case. Instead, I propose that the justifying principle behind restitution prevention of unjust enrichment - lacks the moral force necessary to resolve a
controversial public dispute about moral rights and obligations among
segments of society.
Courts and scholars tend to associate restitution and unjust enrichment with
a special attentiveness to morality and particularized justice not found
elsewhere in law. 4 Yet, the virtues of a claim based on unjust enrichment are
mixed at best. At its core, an unjust enrichment claim seeks to right a wrong
not by alleviating the adverse consequences to the victim, but by diminishing
the position of others. In other words, the notion of unjust enrichment is a
comparative idea that draws on resentment and the desire for retaliation, rather
than the desire to be made whole.5 Retaliatory impulses are probably
inevitable in human affairs, 6 and asserting a legal claim to restitution is a
comparatively civilized form of retaliation. Therefore, it seems wise to include
restitution among the legal remedies available in private disputes. But the lofty
moral claims sometimes made for restitution are puzzling. For this reason,
restitution seems out of place in a major public controversy, such as the debate
over slavery reparations. To the extent that reparations claims are resolved
through private legal actions adjudicated by courts, the dominant theory of
recovery should focus on harm and compensation, rather than on distributive
comparisons and elimination of gains.
In making this argument, I take no position on the overall moral or legal
viability of a claim to reparations for slavery. Nor do I discuss the propriety of
judicial, as opposed to legislative, resolution of the slavery reparations issue.
My point is only that reparations claims should be made and assessed as claims
for compensation, not as claims for restitution based on unjust enrichment.
I.

REPARATIONS AS COMPENSATION FOR HARM

Slavery reparation claims, when asserted as claims for compensation, face a

4 See, e.g., Sharp v. Kosmalski, 351 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 1976) (suggesting that unjust
enrichment is defined by "application of the principles of equity"); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW
OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 4.1(1) (2d ed. 1993) (suggesting that in
cases of unjust enrichment, as in cases of equity, courts apply "a law of 'good
conscience'); Peter Linzer, Rough Justice:A Theory of Restitution andReliance, Contracts
and Torts, 2001 Wisc. L. REv. 695, 700-04 (criticizing the "conservative" approach to
restitution

taken by

the

draft RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF RESTITUTION AND

UNJUST

ENRICHMENT, and preferring to treat restitution as a source of flexibility and particularized
justice in law).
5 See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text (illustrating the connection between
claims for unjust enrichment and desires for retaliation fueled by resentment).
6 See Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1387, 1411
(2003) (suggesting that retaliatory motives, such as revenge, "have deep roots in human

nature").
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variety of difficulties that have been well described by others.7 Looking only
at the initial harm to slaves, there are problems in determining an appropriate
baseline from which to measure the effects of enslavement. 8 If the initial
injury can somehow be defined, the passage of time and the countless human
acts and choices that have intervened lead to daunting problems in tracing the
injury to current generations of African Americans and separating the harm of
enslavement from the effects of more recent public and private acts. 9 The
problem of linking past harm to present claimants is not only a problem of
proof, but also one of logic because few if any current claimants would exist in
a counterfactual world in which slavery did not occur.' 0 Further, time has
eliminated all or nearly all defendants who participated in the wrongdoing.1
I See Stephen Kershnar, The Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations, 8 LEGAL THEORY
243, 247-51 (2002) (arguing that slavery did not cause compensable injury to descendants
because those descendants would not have existed in the absence of slavery, but recognizing
a limited claim based on an inheritance of injury); Ellen Frankel Paul, Set-Asides,
Reparations,and Compensatory Justice, in COMPENSATORY JUSTICE: NOMOS XXXIII 97,
111-22 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991) (concluding that remedial programs for descendants
of slaves cannot be justified on grounds of compensatory justice); Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 1, at 699-701 (summarizing the problems surrounding claims to compensation);
Jenna Thompson, HistoricalInjustice and Reparation:Justifying Claims of Descendants,
112 ETHICS 114, 115-20 (2001) (explaining the problems of identity and causation entailed
in a claim to compensation for direct injustice, but defending a claim based on loss of
inheritance); Jeremy Waldron, RedressingHistoricInjustice, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 135, 14358 (2002) (identifying serious difficulties in the counterfactual analysis of the effects of
historical injustice when time and human choice have intervened, and suggesting that
entitlements may fade over time or be superceded by current concerns); Jeremy Waldron,
SupercedingHistoricInjustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 7-11 (1992) (discussing further the difficulties
involved in any counterfactual analysis of the effects of historical injustice).
I See Paul, supra note 7, at 119-20 (posing questions about the position of slave
descendants). But see Kershnar, supra note 7, at 245-46 (arguing that the focus should be
on token harms rather than on net harm and benefit).
9 See Paul, supra note 7, at 124-28 (discussing the difficulties of "[r]ecreating each
person's history and ancestry of brutalization" in Stalin's reign of terror); Waldron,
Redressing Historic Injustice, supra note 7, 143-46 (commenting on the difficulties of the
counterfactual speculation involved in reparations cases, which seeks "to transform the
present so that it matches as closely as possible the way things would be now if the injustice
had not occurred"); Thompson, supra note 7, at 115-17 (explaining why claims based on
historical injustice "collapse ...to demands for reparation for present or recent injuries").
"0See Kershnar, supra note 7, at 246-47 (arguing that slavery may have caused the
existence of current claimants); Thompson, supra note 7, at 115-17 ("African-Americans
who presently exist would never have been born if their ancestors had not been abducted
and forced into slavery."); Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, supra note 7, at 145
("Children may be conceived and born, and leave descendants, who would not have existed
if the injustice had not occurred.").
" See Paul, supra note 7, at 118 (explaining that "the heirs of immigrants who arrived in
the post-Civil War period comprise most of the population of the United States" and, thus,
"individuals who never themselves contributed to slavery ...must bear the burden of the
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These problems affect the moral case for reparations and harden into serious
doctrinal obstacles when reparations claims are presented to courts.12
Some of the difficulties entailed in a compensation-based reparations claim
can be solved, or bypassed, by characterizing the claim as a group claim to
3
reparations - a claim for harm inflicted on African Americans by whites.'
Groups, at least arguably, have a life span that exceeds the lifetime of
individual members and they can assert claims without identifying the harm
suffered by particular members of the group.
A group claim, however, raises problems of group definition, particularly in
light of subsequent intermarriage and immigration. 14 Given the passage of
time, group claims also raise the possibility of offsets, such as credit for losses
suffered by whites during the Civil War. 15 More fundamentally, the concept of
a group claim conflicts with common understandings of moral and legal rights
and duties. 16 In thinking about corrective justice, we generally assume that
remedy").
12 See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1051-52 (N.D.
II1.2004) (holding that the class action plaintiffs lacked standing because they suffered no
direct injury traceable to the conduct of the defendants). There may be flaws in the district
court's analysis of standing, particularly in regard to injury-in-fact. See id. at 1044-53
(analyzing the doctrinal foundations of standing and applying those doctrines to the slave
descendant plaintiffs to bar them from pursuing their claim). Yet, even if the standing
requirement can be met, the problems the court referred to are likely to resurface as
substantive obstacles to a claim to compensation. For an insightful discussion of the injuryin-fact requirement as developed by the Supreme Court, see Trevor W. Morrison, Private
Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004)
(manuscript at 32-36).
13 See Boxhill, supra note 1, at 277 (arguing that those who identify with and accept the
benefits of membership in a group assume responsibility for group debts); Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 1, at 711 (finding merit in a version of "ethical collectivism" that rests
on the desire to eliminate collective "moral taint"); Paul W. Taylor, Reverse Discrimination
and Compensatory Justice, in REVERSE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 1, at 296, 298-302
(arguing that discrimination based on a morally irrelevant characteristic makes that
characteristic relevant for purposes of compensatory justice and justifies compensation to a
group defined by that characteristic). See generally Carl Wellman, Alternatives for a
Theory of Group Rights, in GROUPS AND GROUP RIGHTS 17, 17-42 (Christine Sistare et al.

eds., 2001) (providing an overview of moral and legal rights as applied to groups).
"' See Boris Bittker, Identifying the Beneficiaries, in REVERSE DISCRIMINATION, supra
note 1, at 279, 279-87 (discussing the difficulties of racial identification); Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 1, at 707 (noting the indeterminacy and overlap of all "groups").
Within groups, of course, not all members will have equal connections to the injustice. See
Alan H. Goldman, Reparations to Individuals or Groups?, in REVERSE DISCRIMINATION,
supra note 1, at 321, 322 ("[T]hose individuals will always be hired first who have suffered
least from prior discrimination ....).
15 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 708 (posing questions about group-based
counterfactuals).
16 See, e.g., J. L. Cowan, Inverse Discrimination, in REVERSE DISCRIMINATION, supra
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claims to compensation belong to individual victims of wrongs
responsibility rests with individual wrongdoers.I1

1447
and

II. THE DOCTRINAL APPEAL OF RESTITUTION
For plaintiffs asserting a legal claim to reparations, the law of restitution
offers several doctrinal advantages over ordinary rules for recovery of
compensatory damages. The first of these is the much-cited principle of unjust
enrichment. 18 Restitution was first recognized as a field of law and ground of
recovery in 1937, when the American Law Institute published the first
Restatement of Restitution.19 The Restatement was founded on the theory that
a variety of remedies and claims with ancient roots could be understood as
instances of a single principle of moral and legal liability; the principle that one
person should not be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. 20 Despite
some differences of opinion about the meaning and operative force of this
21
principle, unjust enrichment has become a familiar part of legal vocabulary.
note 1, at 291, 292-93 (arguing that "injustice done ... [African Americans] as individuals
should be prevented or rectified insofar as possible. But past or future discrimination and
injustice done 'them' as a group and special advantages to them as a group are both out of
the question, since in the moral context there is no such group").
17 See, e.g., id. (arguing that "the original premise of the moral irrelevance of blackness
on the basis of which the original attribution of unjust discrimination rests implies that there
is and can be no morally relevant group which could have suffered or to which retribution
can now be made"); Paul, supra note 7, at 121 ("If every victim of an unjust act were
compensated, where is the remainder of injustice that is owed to the group? What is the
group, other than its members... ?); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 699 (describing
"ethical individualism" as "a strong tradition in the United States"); cf James W. Nickel,
Should Reparations Be to Individuals or to Groups?, in REVERSE DISCRIMINATION, supra
note 1, at 314, 315-16 (favoring reparations to groups on administrative grounds, but
asserting that the underlying justification must be the harm done to individuals).
11See Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29, 32 (1938)
(explaining the underlying theory of restitution as a remedy for one person's unjust
enrichment at the expense of another).
19 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937); Seavey & Scott, supra note 18, at 2935 (explaining the Restatement of Restitution's publication and purpose).
20 See Seavey & Scott, supra note 18, at 32 (stating the foundation of the law of
restitution as the notion that "[a] person has a right to have restored to him a benefit gained

at his expense by another, if the retention of the benefit by the other would be unjust. The
law protects this right by granting restitution of the benefit which otherwise would, in most
cases, unjustly enrich the recipient")
21 For discussion of the principle of unjust enrichment, see generally PETER BIRKs, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 18-25 (1989), DAGAN, supra note 1; JOHN P.
DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1951), Symposium, Restitution

and Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1763 (2001), Andrew Kull, Rationalizing
Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REv.

1191 (1995),

and Douglas Laycock, The Scope and

Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1277 (1989). A draft Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment is now in preparation.
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Because the term unjust enrichment is broad and morally charged, it has
become a popular vehicle for novel legal claims. 22 Tort and contract law,
although substantively attentive to fairness, are not associated with any similar
emblematic reference to what is just.2 3 The comparatively recent entry of
restitution into law also makes a broad principle such as unjust enrichment
particularly potent, because rules of restitution have not been as fully
elaborated as rules of tort and contract. Thus, for better or worse, the principle
of unjust enrichment invites courts to innovate in ways they might not when
24
operating within the doctrinal confines of tort and contract law.
Unjust enrichment may also provide an answer to the objection that slavery
was permissible under the positive law of the time. 25 On its face, the term
26
unjust enrichment reaches beyond what is illegal to what is simply unjust.
Therefore, unlike compensation, unjust enrichment can be read to cover
27
conduct that was morally wrong although sanctioned by law.
A second advantage for reparations claimants is that the structure of an
unjust enrichment claim avoids some of the problems of proof that affect
compensation claims. A claim of unjust enrichment requires proof that the
defendant was enriched at the plaintiffs expense. 28 This does not necessarily
imply that the plaintiff must prove that he or she suffered an injury to person or
property; it is enough that the plaintiff lost an expected benefit or, in some
cases, that the plaintiff simply has a superior moral claim to whatever
enrichment the defendant obtained. 29 For example, when the beneficiary of a
22 For example, courts have sometimes recognized unjust enrichment claims by
unmarried cohabitants following a break-up. See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303,
313-14 (Wis. 1987) (holding that "unmarried cohabitants may raise claims based upon
unjust enrichment following the termination of their relationships where one of the parties
attempts to retain an unreasonable amount of the property acquired through the efforts of

both"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 2004); DAGAN, supranote 1,at 194-213.
23 See Seavey & Scott, supra note 18, at 29-32 (indicating that contract and tort law
remedies focus on "wrong and harm" and that restitution serves the different, yet often
overlapping, purpose of achieving justice).
24 See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 1, at 194-213.
25 See id. at 281 n. 138 (noting, in this connection, that restitution does not require that the
defendant's act be legally wrongful).
26 See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (explaining that the law of restitution
applies in many cases even though the defendant has not committed any wrongful or illegal
act).
27 See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
28 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §

1 (1937).

29 See id. § 1 cmt. e (noting that restitution may be appropriate when "a benefit has been

received by the defendant but the plaintiff has not suffered a corresponding loss or, in some
cases, any loss, but nevertheless the enrichment of the defendant would be unjust"); Daniel
Friedman, Restitution for Wrongs: The Basis of Liability, in RESTITUTION: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GARETH JONES 133, 152-54 (W.R. Cornish et al. eds.,
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will murders the testator, an heir who would not otherwise have inherited the
estate may claim restitution from the murderer. 30 Similarly, a trust beneficiary
31
may recover a bribe paid to the trustee even if trust assets were not impaired.
Precedents of this type suggest that reparations claimants suing on the ground
of unjust enrichment need not establish that they personally were harmed by
the practice of slavery.
Nor does a claim of unjust enrichment require that the defendant be a
wrongdoer. 32 There are many recognized instances of restitution from
defendants who innocently obtained a benefit to which they were not fairly
entitled. For example, one who pays a debt to the wrong person by mistake
may recover the payment although the recipient committed no wrong. 33 A
plaintiff defrauded of property by a wrongdoer may recover from the
wrongdoer's innocent donee. 34 The intended beneficiary of a will that was
wrongfully suppressed may recover from an heir who benefited incidentally
from another heir's misdeeds. 35 By analogy, it appears that reparations
1998) (discussing situations in which claimants may be entitled to restitution although the
defendant did not appropriate the claimant's property).
30See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that a murdererbeneficiary may not benefit under the testator-victim's will and, instead, granting the

decedent's estate to the testator's heirs at law);

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §

187 (2) &

cmts. g, h ("Where a person is murdered by his heir or next of kin, and dies intestate, the
heir or next of kin holds the property thus acquired by him upon a constructive trust for the
person or persons who would have been heirs or next of kin if he had predeceased the
intestate.").
31 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §

197 ("Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty

to the beneficiary receives or retains a bonus or commission or other profit, he holds what
he receives upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary.").
32 See id. §§ 1, 3 (distinguishing between restitution based on unjust enrichment, which
does not require the defendant be a wrongdoer, and restitution based on tort, which does
require some legally wrongful act); BIRKS, supra note 21, at 23-24, 39-44 (distinguishing
between restitution based on "subtraction" from the claimant and restitution based on
wrongdoing); see also Kull, supra note 21, at 1192 (remarking that liability in restitution
can be independent of any breach of duty recognized by tort or contract law).

" See RESTATEMENT

OF RESTITUTION

§ 22 ("A person who has paid money to or for the

account of another not intended by him, is entitled to restitution from the payee or from the
beneficiary of the payment, unless the payee or beneficiary is protected as a contracting
party or as a bona fide purchaser."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 6 (Discussion Draft, 2000) (stating that "[p]ayment of money to one who is
not the intended recipient, or payment when no payment is intended, gives the payor a claim
in restitution against the recipient" and that "[p]ayment of money resulting from a mistake
as to the existence or extent of the payor's obligation to an intended recipient gives the
payor a claim in restitution against the recipient to the extent the payment was not due").
This is one of many forms of mistaken payment of money for which restitution is commonly
available.
14 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 204 & illus. 1.
" See, e.g., Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. 1948) (imposing a
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claimants, proceeding on the basis of unjust enrichment,36need not establish that
the defendants participated in the institution of slavery.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the plaintiffs in a class action seeking
slavery reparations relied substantially on unjust enrichment. 37 The suit was
filed on behalf of descendants of slaves against corporate defendants alleged to
have participated in or supported the institution of slavery. 38 The complaint
described the many injuries suffered by the plaintiffs' ancestors, as well as

continuing harm to the plaintiffs themselves. 39

It sought not only

compensatory and punitive damages, but also restitution for the value of labor

constructive trust).
36

Some restitution scholars might find the description of doctrine offered in the last two

paragraphs overly generous. Precedents in the law of restitution include many instances of
recovery by claimants who have not suffered a direct loss, and many instances of recovery
against defendants who have not committed legal wrongs. See supra notes 28-35 and
accompanying text. It is difficult, however, to find instances of recovery in which there is
neither a loss to the claimant nor a legal wrong by the defendant. The closest cases may be
those in which an expectant legatee claims restitution from heirs who received a portion of
the decedent's estate but did not participate in the wrongs that led to their inheritance. See
id. Even here, however, the disappointed legatee has a plausible claim of personal loss
although she lacks a property interest in the estate. At least some analyses suggest that this
is not simply the result of incomplete elaboration of the principle of unjust enrichment, but
an inherent limit on the scope of restitution. See BIRKS, supra note 21, at 23-24, 32-38, 4043 (analyzing the phrase "at the plaintiffs expense" and dividing instances of restitution
into cases of "subtraction" from the claimant and cases of wrongdoing to the claimant). But
see Friedman, supra note 29, at 152-54 (discussing several situations in which claimants
may be entitled to restitution although the defendant did not appropriate property of the
plaintiff and did not commit an act that, apart from retention of gains, would constitute a
legal wrong toward the plaintiff).
31 See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1042-44 (N.D.
I11.2004) (describing the counts of the claimants' complaint, which included a claim based
on unjust enrichment). This case consolidated a number of similar claims filed in different
district courts. See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1357,
1358-59 (J.P.M.L. 2002). The case ultimately was dismissed without prejudice. See In re
Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1075; see also infra note 46 and accompanying
text.
31 Specifically, defendants included the corporate successors in interest to banks and
brokers that loaned money to slave traders and slaveholders, insurance companies that
allegedly issued policies protecting against loss of human property, railroads built with slave
labor, and companies that traded in cotton and tobacco cultivated by slaves. See In re Slave
Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1039-41.
39 First Consolidated and Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 10-115, In re
African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. I11.2004) (MDL No.
1491) (discussing, in detail, the history of slavery and racial discrimination in the United
States, and highlighting the harms that the plaintiffs and their ancestors suffered because of
such
slavery
and
discrimination),
available
at
http://www.aetna.com/legal-issues/suits/06-26-03_complaint.pdf
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converted from slaves and disgorgement of profits from slavery. 40
An obvious difficulty. affecting the claim to compensation is that the
plaintiffs' enslaved ancestors are long dead. 4 1 Harms suffered by the Plaintiffs
themselves are most plausibly viewed as the products of later policies, acts,
and omissions.42 Meanwhile, even if the defendants (viewed as the present
embodiments of their corporate predecessors) were responsible for harms to
slaves, they are not linked in any concrete way to these more recent sources of
harm to the plaintiffs.

43

The various claims to restitution included in the complaint are less
vulnerable to objections based on harm and responsibility. As recounted
above, standard restitution doctrine suggests that claimants can prevail without
proving that they personally sustained a loss or that the defendants caused their
ancestors a loss. 44 Thus, reparations plaintiffs need only show that the
defendants in fact benefited from slavery and that, if slaves had been paid or
treated humanely, at least some of the value the defendants retain might have
45
found its way to the plaintiffs as descendants.
Ultimately, the District Court dismissed the case. 46 It concluded that the
plaintiffs lacked standing and added a series of alternative grounds for
dismissal, including justiciability and failure to comply with applicable statutes
of limitation. 47 Nevertheless, it is easy to see why the plaintiffs believed that
an unjust enrichment claim would place their suit on sounder doctrinal footing
than a simple claim to compensation for harm. If the case is revived, unjust
48
enrichment is likely to play a role.
This is not to say that the legal case for reparations based on unjust
enrichment is unimpeachable. One difficulty is that the principle of unjust
40 Id. at 116 (stating plaintiffs' prayers for relief).

41 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 116-17 (discussing the difficulties of claims based on
harm to ancestors)
42 See id. at 118-19 (explaining that living plaintiffs' claims of harm from slavery
collapse into claims based on harm from subsequent policies).
41 See In re Slave DescendantsLitig., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1049-50 (finding an absence of
allegations connecting defendants with continuing injuries to the plaintiffs).
I See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text..
46 In re Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
17 See id. (finding no injury in fact or causation, but proceeding to adjudicate other
grounds for dismissal as well). As noted earlier, the court's analysis of standing may not
have taken proper account of the gain-orientation of restitution claims. See supra note 12
and accompanying text.
48 The case was dismissed without prejudice, In re Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F.
Supp. 2d at 1075, and the plaintiffs have since filed an amended complaint. See Second
Consolidated and Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, In re African-Am. Slave
Descendants' Litig., MDL No. 1491, (N.D. Ill. April 5, 2004). The new complaint contains,
among other things, additional information about the class representative and their
ancestors. See id. at 25-35.
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enrichment may not be as far-reaching as it first appears. Most of the
established grounds for restitution against defendants who are not wrongdoers
can be explained by reading the term "unjust enrichment" to mean enrichment
that lacks legal justification, without reference to injustice in a purely moral
sense. 49 On this interpretation, compliance with positive law might continue to
be an obstacle to recovery. More generally, there is disagreement about
whether unjust enrichment is in fact an authoritative principle of law from
50
which judges can deduce a right to recovery in novel situations.
Another difficulty is that, when a long period of time has passed since the
initial injustice, restitution raises its own problems of proof, logic, and fairness.
Slave descendants must establish that those who profited from slavery did so at
the descendants' expense. 51 Not only is ancestry difficult to trace, but there is
no guarantee that descendants would eventually have enjoyed assets or
advantages lost to their ancestors. 52 Reparations claimants must also establish

49 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §

1 cmt. b
(Discussion Draft, 2000) (referring to "what is more appropriately called unjustified
enrichment ....Unjustified enrichment is enrichment that lacks an adequate legal basis...
(emphasis added)). The question whether to interpret unjust enrichment as referring to
justice generally or only to enrichment without legal justification has been a source of
controversy in discussions surrounding the draft Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment. See, e.g., Peter Linzer, Comments on Discussion Draft of the
Restatement of the Law Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 2000 A.L.I. PRoc. 237,
237-38 (arguing for a broader interpretation of unjust enrichment).
50 See., e.g., JACK BEATSON, THE USE AND ABUSE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 1-2 (1991)
(endorsing the view that unjust enrichment is a source of legal obligations); BIRKS, supra
note 21, at 18-25 (suggesting that unjust enrichment is an organizing principle rather than a
standard for decision); DAGAN, supra note 1, at 12 (maintaining that unjust enrichment is
"both a 'common theme or an organizational principle' and "a helpful reminder of the
potential viability of the normative underpinnings of' restitution); Robert Goff, The Search
for Principle,in THE SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLE 313, 324 (William Swadling & Gareth Jones

eds., 1999) (suggesting that unjust enrichment is a decisional principle and that the role of
doctrine is to define its limits); Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the
Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REv. 2083, 2084, 2112-13 (2001) (favoring the
view that unjust enrichment functions as "a descriptive and organizational principle" rather
than a standard for decision).
51 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937) ("A person who has been unjustly

enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other." (emphasis
added)).
52 The district court made this point in the course of dismissing reparations claims in In
re Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 ("Plaintiffs can only speculate that
their ancestors' estates would have been passed on to them, and cannot say that they would
have inherited their ancestors' lost pay"). See also Kershnar, supra note 7, at 258 (citing
"the proliferation of factors that lead families over generations to lose wealth, sell off
claims..., or disinherit one another"); Waldron, RedressingHistoricInjustice, supra note
7, at 144 (discussing counterfactuals involving choice, which illustrate the difficulty of
tracing benefits across generations).
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the fact of enrichment. 53 The continued existence of corporate entities makes it

54
possible to identify existing defendants who were enriched by slavery.
Assuming that corporate principals were aware at the time of the source of
their gains, it also rules out a change of position defense. 55 The actual costs of
a judgment against the corporation, however, will fall on shareholders, 56 and
perhaps on consumers if liability is industry-wide. It is difficult to see how
individual shareholders who purchased their shares at market value after the
abolition of slavery have been enriched. 57 The argument that purchasers of
shares understand that the corporation may be liable for past wrongs of this
kind is implausible and, in any event, would not establish an unjust enrichment
58
unless the price of shares was reduced to reflect potential liability.
These various doctrinal and evidentiary difficulties suggest that despite
initial appearances, a restitution-based claim to reparations for slavery, like a
compensation claim, is most plausibly described as a claim by and against
groups rather than individuals. Group membership, not ancestry, provides the
most direct link between current claimants' demand for reparations and
defendants' unjust gains. 59 Corporate defendants, meanwhile, are stand-ins for,
and perhaps rough loss-spreaders within, the group that initially reaped a
60
gain.

13 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (requiring an unjust enrichment before a
meritorious restitution claim vests).
" See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 738 (asserting that many corporations that
benefited from slavery still exist and, thus, "recent efforts to target corporations that issued
insurance policies to slave owners might be more successful").

55 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 142 & cmts. a & c (permitting a change of

circumstances defense, but limiting the defense to cases in which the defendant did not act
tortiously, was no more at fault than the claimant, and was not aware of the grounds for
restitution).
56 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 704 ("The victim seeks compensation from
the 'corporation," but this means that shareholders would have to pay. And this is true even
if the current shareholders - the ones who must pay through devaluation of their shares - are
different from the shareholders at the time that the wrong was committed.").
51See id. at 705-06 (discussing a hypothetical reparations case and noting that the
shareholders "who pay the reparations through the corporation are different from the people
who committed the wrong through the corporation").
58See id. at 703-06 (describing, without endorsing or rejecting, various "soft
individualist" approaches to corporate and individual collective responsibility).
19See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (examining the advantages and
disadvantages of framing slavery reparations claims in terms of the harms caused to slaves
and their descendants as a homogeneous group).
60 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 736-39 (discussing the role of corporate and
other institutional defendants in reparations cases as "stand-ins" for the individuals who
committed the actual wrong).
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THE ETHICS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT

A reparations claim styled as a claim to restitution avoids some, but not all,
of the doctrinal obstacles to a claim to compensation for loss. 6 1 Attention to
gains means, first, that plaintiffs need not prove a direct injury to themselves
and, second, that gain substitutes for responsibility on the defendants' side. 62
In this section, I shall assume that, notwithstanding some doctrinal obstacles, a
legal case can be made for reparations based on unjust enrichment.
Even if unjust enrichment has doctrinal advantages over standard tort law,
there are normative reasons why reparations claims should not be argued and
resolved on this ground. Unjust enrichment is not a good platform for
reparations claims because it draws on sentiments of resentment that are out of
place in a highly-charged public controversy. For this reason, reparations
claims should stand or fall as claims to compensation.
Recall, first, that unjust enrichment focuses on gains. Restitution claims
often - although not always - involve a combination of loss on one side and
gain on the other. Losses, however, are properly handled by compensatory
remedies and related substantive law.
Restitution operates when the
defendant's gains exceed the claimant's loss, 63 when the claimant has suffered
no compensable harm,64 or when the defendant holds gains, but has not
committed a wrong that makes him, her, or it responsible for the claimant's
loss. 65 Thus, what restitution and the principle of unjust enrichment contribute
66
to the law is the claim to gains.
At least when the defendant has committed no wrong to the plaintiff, the
organizing principle of restitution is the idea that one person should not be
unjustly enriched at another's expense. 67 The unjust enrichment principle
states what is generally assumed to be an impeccable maxim of corrective
61 See supra notes 7-60 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrinal benefits and

problems in framing claims for slavery reparations in terms of restitution instead of
compensation).
61 See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151 (1937) (providing for disgorgement of
the profits of conscious wrongdoers).
64 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
65 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
66 See Kull, supra note 21, at 1196-98 (arguing that restitution should be defined
exclusively as a gain-based ground of liability). But see John P. Dawson, Restitution
Without Enrichment,61 B.U. L. REv. 563, 577 (1981) (suggesting that restitution remedies
are not always dependent, or even essentially dependent, on enrichment).
67 There is disagreement between those who see unjust enrichment as the organizing
principle behind all of restitution law, and those who divide restitution into restitution based
on wrongdoing and restitution based on unjust enrichment in the absence of legal
wrongdoing. See Kull, supra note 21, at 1196-97 (defining restitution in terms of unjust
enrichment); Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REv.

1767, 1769-77 (2001) (adopting a "multicausalist" position, in opposition to the view that
restitution "quadrates" with unjust enrichment).
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justice and lends a special moral tone to restitution claims. John Dawson
explained the appeal of the principle of unjust enrichment "by invoking some
rudimentary psychology ....To the person who has suffered loss, the loss
alone is a grievance. But if this loss can be located and identified in the gain
received by another, the anguish caused by the loss will be felt as more than
doubled. ' 68 Lon Fuller, arguing that restitution is the strongest ground for
recovery for breach of contract, observed that "the restitution interest presents
twice as strong a claim to judicial intervention as the reliance interest, since if
A not only causes B to lose one unit but appropriates that unit to himself, the
'6 9
resulting discrepancy between A and B is not one unit but tWo."
The long history and wide influence of the principle of unjust enrichment
suggest that the logic described by Dawson and Fuller has a strong grip on
human imagination. 70 The moral force of a claim of unjust enrichment,
however, is seldom fully analyzed. If unjust enrichment is to serve as the basis
for novel claims, and especially for socially divisive claims such as reparations
for slavery, a closer examination is in order.
The discussion that follows centers on the posture a claimant assumes in
asserting an unjust enrichment claim, rather than the effects that legal relief in
this form may have on behavior. 71 Different legal strategies reflect, and
possibly encourage, different attitudes and sentiments on the part of disputing
parties. These attitudes and sentiments are the focus of my analysis.
As a starting point, consider a series of possible ways in which the victim of
a wrong or injury may respond to the cause of harm. First, the victim may
seek compensation, meaning a transfer of resources designed to restore the
victim as nearly as possible to his or her "rightful position. ' 72 Compensatory

68

See DAWSON, supra note 21, at 5.
William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 1,

69 L. L. Fuller &

46 YALE L.J. 52, 56 (1936).
70 Unjust enrichment, as a basis for legal recovery, dates at least to Roman times and

plays a significant role in modem civil law as well as common law. For a classic historical
and comparative analysis of unjust enrichment, see DAWSON, supra note 21, at 41-109.
71 In making this argument, I do not intend to present an expressive theory of unjust
enrichment. See generally, Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000). My

argument is simply that a reparations claim based on unjust enrichment reflects certain
attitudes on the part of parties and interested observers, and that recognition of the claim
might encourage those attitudes. It may be that judicial recognition of an unjust enrichmentbased reparations claim would also express official endorsement of the attitudes it entails.
On the other hand, it seems implausible that by recognizing such a claim, courts would
communicate endorsement in a linguistic sense. In any event, I am concerned here with the
posture of the parties, rather than the symbolic significance ofjudicial action.
72 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 16-17 (3d ed. 2002) (identifying

and explaining the phrase "rightful position" as it relates to claims for compensation).
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damages are, of course, the standard form of legal relief in private law.7 3
Assuming that the expectation of security in one's person and holdings is a
fair one, a claim to compensation is ethically appealing.7 4 Compensation
restores the victim's welfare and affirms his or her rights. According to
prevailing theories of corrective justice, compensatory liability imposed on
wrongdoers enforces moral duties owed by injurers to their victims. 75 The
practice of compensating victims also has societal benefits; it protects
entitlements, reduces the need for wasteful precautions, and, when liability is
placed on those who caused the harm, forces injurers to internalize the costs of
their acts. 76 Thus, a victim who seeks compensation can be seen as pursuing
his or her own interests in a way that is morally justified and has desirable
consequences for society.
A second possible response to injury is to inflict harm on the injurer. When
the injurer is blameworthy and the harm imposed is proportionate to the wrong
done, this type of response can be viewed as retributive. The morality of
retribution is a disputed question, but for those who accept retribution as a
form of justice, it enforces moral desert and may perform other functions as
well. 77
71

In law, retributive penalties are most often imposed collectively

See, e.g., id. at 11-231 (analyzing and illustrating compensatory remedies).

71 I have argued elsewhere that nominally compensatory remedies, as they appear in law,

are not purely compensatory because they also accommodate the desire to retaliate.
Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, supra note 6, at 1411-13 ("[T]he reverent
descriptions of compensation that prevail in legal discussion are disingenuous. People are
aggressive, they retaliate when hurt, and lawsuits provide vehicles for retaliatory aggression.
Corrective justice, despite the high moral ground often claimed for it, is a close companion
to revenge."). I refer here to claims motivated solely by the desire to restore one's welfare
following an injury.
75 See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 374-75 (1992) (defending a "mixed
conception" of corrective justice); Stephen R. Perry, Loss, Agency, and Responsibility for
Outcomes: Three Conceptions of Corrective Justice, in TORT THEORY 24, 25-26, 38-47 (Ken
Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993) (defending a "comparative conception" of
corrective justice). See generally Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care
One Owes One's Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992) (connecting Aristotle's
conception of corrective justice to modem philosophies of private law).
76 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 610, at 192, 209 (3d ed.
1986) (discussing the incentive effects of compensatory damages).
77 For varying retributive theories of punishment, see ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 374-80 (1981) (explaining retribution as necessary to connect the wrongdoer
to "correct" moral values); Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND

MERCY 111, 122-47 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds.,1988) [hereinafter Hampton,
Retributive Idea] (explaining retribution as a means of affirming the value of the victim);
Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND
THE EMOTIONS 179, 182 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (defending retribution as a good in
itself, on grounds of moral desert); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE

MONIST 475, 482-86 (1968) (explaining retribution as a balance of moral accounts). The
debate between utilitarians and retributivists over justifications for punishment is described
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according to criminal law. Victims, however, may be authorized to pursue
retribution through punitive damages and to participate, in a limited way, in the
criminal process.

78

The purest and most easily defensible sentiment on the part of one who
seeks retribution against a wrongful injurer is what Jean Hampton called moral
indignation. 79 Moral indignation is a form of righteous anger directed toward
the wrongful act and the immoral values that inspired it.80 Closely associated
with moral indignation is moral or retributive hatred directed toward the
wrongdoer because the wrongdoer has adopted unacceptable values or
practices.8' These retributive sentiments may be felt not only by victims of the
82
wrong, but by all members of society.
At this point a distinction should be drawn between retributive responses
and retaliation. 83 Retribution and retaliation may coalesce in a single act of
revenge, but they differ in several respects.8 4 Retaliation is particular to
victims or associates of victims acting on the victims' behalf.8 5 The primary
sentiment accompanying retaliation is not impersonal moral indignation, but
personal resentment of the injury and the comparative advantage of the
wrongdoer.8 6 In a typical case of retaliation, the victim of an injury feels
in Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 727, 728-31 (Joel Feinberg &
Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000).
78 On victim participation in the criminal process, see generally Robert P. Mosteller,
Victims'Rights, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1639, 1639-44 (Joshua Dressier

ed., 2d ed. 2002) (describing the goals and accomplishments of victims' rights groups). On
punitive damages, see generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3.1 l(i)-(iii), and LAYCOCK, supra
note 72, at 719-68.
79 Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY,
supra note 77, at 35, 56-60 [hereinafter Hampton, Forgiveness](defining moral indignation
and distinguishing it from resentment). Acts of revenge that function in a retributive way
may be driven by a variety of less appealing emotions. See Moore, supra note 77, at 192
(discussing the "witch's brew" of "resentment, fear, anger, cowardice, hostility, aggression,
cruelty, sadism, envy, jealousy, guilt, self-loathing, hypocrisy, and self-deception").
80See Hampton, Forgiveness, supra note 79, at 56 (explaining that those who are
morally indignant focus "on the fact that the wrongdoer has made a moral mistake" and
"they protest the action because they want to defend the value which makes the behavior
wrong").
81 See id. at 79-83 (defining moral hatred); Jeffrie Murphy, Hatred: A QualifiedDefense,
in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 77, at 88, 89-90 [hereinafter Murphy, Hatred]
(associating retribution with "retributive hatred" - meaning a desire to inflict harm in order
to restore "moral balance").
82 See Hampton, Forgiveness, supra note 79, at 56 (describing moral indignation as an
impersonal anger, often felt by witnesses).
83See NOZICK, supra note 77, at 366-68 (highlighting the differences between retribution
and revenge).
84 See id.
85 See id. at 367.

86 See id. (characterizing revenge, in contrast to retribution, as "personal"); Hampton,
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diminished and demeaned, and seeks to resist the implicit suggestion that the
87
injurer's activities are more important than the victim's well-being.
Accordingly, the victim strikes back, and by inflicting some retaliatory harm
88
on the injurer, asserts his or her own equivalent value.
Because retaliation and resentment are based on the diminished position of
the victim, they are not necessarily limited to wrongful harm. 89 When the
injurer is not blameworthy, moral indignation is out of place and the desire to
strike back cannot properly be characterized as retributive. Nevertheless, the
victim of injury may compare his or her own position to that of the injurer and
resent the fact that the injurer is untouched, or is even enjoying a gain. 90 The
victim's resentment of this state of affairs will surely be stronger when the
injurer is morally at fault, 9 1 but the comparative comfort of the injurer may be
enough in itself to provoke an angry response. In addition, the victim may
resent the seeming indifference of an injurer who has caused the victim a
setback and has done nothing to alter the distributive imbalance that results.
Thus, retaliatory responses to injury are distinct from retributive responses

Forgiveness,supra note 79, at 56 (defining resentment as a "personally defensive protest").
87 See Hampton, Forgiveness,supra note 79, at 57-58 (describing the feelings frequently

associated with "resentment" and explaining that "[tihe resenter denies to himself (and
anyone else) that he is low in rank and value, and thereby defies the appearance (implicit in
the demeaning action) that he is").
88 See id. at 59-60 (defining resentment as "the defiant reaffirmation of one's rank and
value in the face of treatment calling them into question in one's own mind"); Jeffrie
Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 77, at 14,
25 [hereinafter Murphy, Forgiveness] (Injuries are "messages - symbolic communications.
They are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to us, 'I count but you do not,' or 'I can use you
for my purposes,' or 'I am here up high and you are there down below"').
89 Murphy and Hampton generally associate resentment with wrongdoing. See Hampton,
Forgiveness, supra note 79, at 54-55 (defining resentment as a response to wrongdoing);
Murphy, Forgiveness,supra note 88, at 16 (linking resentment to "wrongs against oneself').
Others, however, have recognized that resentment and retaliation may respond to injury
alone.

See PETER A. FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF VENGEANCE 95, 97 (2001) (describing

"simple resentment" as a possible response to non-wrongful injury); NOZICK, supra note 77,
at 366-67 (stating that victims may seek revenge for slights or injuries, in addition to
wrongs); cf WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT 78-81 (2003) (proposing that "stupidity and

carelessness of others can provoke us to vengeance as readily as pointed assaults can[,]" and
that apologies for accidental harms are often more genuinely heartfelt than apologies for
intentional harms).
90 See Murphy, Hatred,supra note 81, at 89 (arguing that retributive desires often arise
due to "feelings that another person's current level of well-being is undeserved or ill-gotten
(perhaps at one's own expense) and that a reduction in that well-being will simply represent
his getting his just deserts").
9'See id. at 89-90 (differentiating between retributive hatred based on moral or righteous
dimensions and the more irrational and less strongly held hatred motivated by envy and
spite).
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and broader in scope. 92 Retaliation also differs from pursuit of compensation,
in that retaliation seeks to diminish the injurer rather than to make the victim
whole. Ethically, retaliation is less attractive than a claim to compensation
because the objective of retaliation is competitive and the means are
destructive. Inflicting a retaliatory harm may give the victim a sense of
satisfaction, 93 but it does not enable the victim to gain real ground because
94
diminishing another's position does not increase one's own objective value.
Although retaliatory responses to wrongs or injuries are harder to justify
than claims for compensation or pursuit of retributive penalties, 95 retaliation
should also be distinguished from spite or envy. 96 Spite and envy are best
described as responses to another person's competitive success or to
advantages possessed by others, such as beauty, skill, or luck.97 A desire to
strike at those who are more successful or luckier than oneself is vicious
because it stems from one's own failings or deficiencies. 98 Retaliation, in
contrast, responds not just to naturally occurring disadvantage, but to a
disadvantage that stems from a specific transaction involving harm. The
sentiment of resentment that accompanies retaliation reflects the sense that the
victim of an injury is slighted if the source of injury is allowed to carry on
unaffected - or worse yet, to profit. In this way, resentment and retaliation are
tied to self-respect. 99 If not virtuous, they are at least more understandable
than simple envy or spite.
Among the possible responses to injury discussed above, a claim based on
unjust enrichment has most in common with retaliation. By definition,
compensation is not at issue; restitution enters the picture only when
compensatory remedies are inadequate or unavailable. 00 Nor can restitution
92

See NozIcK, supra note 77, at 366-70 (differentiating between retribution and

retaliatory revenge).
91 See FRENCH, supra note 89, at 3 (admitting that the "[t]he sense of accomplishment
and moral righteousness [of successful retaliation] ... can be intoxicating, exhilarating,
[and] sweet").
94 See Hampton, Forgiveness, supra note 79, at 63-64 (describing resentment and

retaliation as self-defeating).
95 See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (discussing retaliatory responses and the
emotions and justifications behind those responses).
96 See Murphy, Hatred, supra note 81, at 89-90 (arguing that retaliatory motives
"typically have a righteous dimension" that is lacking in hatred caused by petty envy and
spite).

97 See Hampton, Forgiveness, supra note 79, at 76-78 (describing spiteful hatred and
distinguishing it from retaliation).
98 Cf Murphy, Hatred,supra note 81, at 89 (distinguishing the desire to avenge a wrong
from spite on the ground that spite reflects "a simple desire to look better than Jones on
some morally irrelevant scale of comparison").
99 See Murphy, Hatred,supra note 81, at 93-95 (arguing that resentment "is essentially
tied to self-respect").
"o See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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be explained as a form of private retribution. As noted, unjust enrichment is
not limited to wrongful gains; the injustice involved may consist of passive
receipt of something that should more fairly belong to the claimant. 10 1 Thus,
although retribution and moral indignation may be present in some restitution
claims, they have no role to play in others.
Of course, a claim to unjust gains is not the prototypical form of retaliation
in which the victim of an injury inflicts a new and comparable injury on the
source of harm. Instead, the claimant extracts gains that are connected in some
way to his or her injury or loss of opportunity. 102 Nevertheless, like retaliation
in its classic form, a claim to restitution is motivated by the comparison
between the defendant's position and that of the claimant, and operates by
taking from the defendant. Restitution enables claimants to even the score by
eliminating gains that, if not wrongful, appear comparatively unfair. In this
way they reflect, and possibly abet, sentiments of resentment. 103
I am not the first to express doubts about the virtues of claims based on
unjust enrichment. Christopher Wonnell has argued that a body of law
concerned with eliminating unjust benefits, rather than repairing unjust harms,
is normatively unattractive. 10 4 Wonnell associates the desire to remove
benefits from another with envy, and notes that "a long philosophical tradition,
both deontological and consequentialist, stands against the general legitimacy
of gratuitous desires to bring down others."' 1 5 Even Dawson, who saw much
promise in the principle of unjust enrichment when used with caution, made
the connection between unjust enrichment and resentment. 10 6
After
commenting that loss located in other's gain is "felt as more than doubled," he
added that the same sentiment was exploited "by Karl Marx, who tapped an

101See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
102 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § I cmt. d (1937) (indicating that in typical cases

of unjust enrichment the loss to one and the benefit to the other are coextensive and, thus,
the law of restitution compels "one to surrender the benefit which he has received and
thereby to make restitution to the other for the loss which he has suffered").
103 See FRENCH, supra note 89, at 3 (discussing resentment as a desire "to retaliate, to
inflict a like, or greater, injury on your offender").
"

Christopher T. Wonnell, Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45

EMORY L.J. 153, 177-90 (1996) (linking gain-based recovery to envy).
.05Id. at 180. Wonnell proposes that the supposedly unitary field of law identified by
Seavey and Scott in the 1937 Restatement should be unraveled, and the principle of unjust
enrichment replaced by four more limited legal principles, none of which is premised on
elimination of unjust gains. See id. at 191-219 (recommending that courts require
disgorgement of profits as a second-best remedy for clear wrongs when compensation is not
feasible; provide a cost-based remedy in cases of "partial divestiture" of title to property;
require disgorgement for deterrent purposes in cases of deliberate violations of rights; and
provide a cost-based remedy when the plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant for
which the defendant would have contracted in the absence of high transaction costs).
106 See DAWSON, supra note 21, at 5-8.
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10 7
inexhaustible supply of resentment with the aid of his labor theory of value."
As noted earlier, I place claims of unjust enrichment and the type of
resentment that accompanies them on a higher plane than simple envy of
others' advantages. 10 8 Resentment, as I have used the term, grows out of a
transaction that caused a setback to the interests of the claimant or someone
connected to the claimant. 10 9 It is linked to self-respect and probably useful in
dealing with others and facing losses."Il 0
I do not mean to suggest that the idea of unjust enrichment should be
abandoned, or that its role in law should be significantly diminished. Gainbased recovery serves good ends. It deters wrongdoing and overreaching in
appropriate cases."' It also corrects outcomes that occur without wrongdoing,
but are evidently unwarranted and are not otherwise addressed by law. 1 2 For
example, if one person pays money to another by mistake, there is no tort or
breach of contract on which to base liability, but the recipient has no good

107 Id. at 5 ("Marx made it appear that the gains received by economic groups other than
labor - particularly by owners of land and other capital assets - were unjustified by their
contribution to the economic product and in the long run were taken from labor.")
108 See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
109 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (defining and discussing retaliation that
is motivated by resentment).
110 See FRENCH, supra note 89, at 3, 35 (recognizing the pleasures and popularity of
revenge); J. L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, in 2 PERSONS AND VALUES:
SELECTED PAPERS 206, 215-18 (Joan Mackie & Penelope Mackie eds., 1985) (discussing the
evolution of vengeful sentiments); see also Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Revenge and
Retaliation, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (forthcoming Univ.
Chicago Press) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author, abstract available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=359200) (presenting a game theoretical analysis of revenge);
Murphy, Hatred, supra note 81, at 93-94 (offering a limited defense of resentment based on
its cormection to self-esteem); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Two Cheers for Vindictiveness, 2
PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y: INT'L J. PENOLOGY 131, 137-39 (2000) (noting some benefits of
revenge).
"'. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151 (1937) (defining the measure of recovery in
cases of property acquired by "consciously tortious conduct" as the value of the property at
the time of acquisition or a higher value "if required to avoid injustice"); id. § 202
(authorizing the creation of constructive trusts in cases of conscious wrongdoing); Laycock,
supra note 21, at 1289 (recognizing the connection between culpability and measures of
restitution). Deterrence, however, is not likely in play in a reparations case. Corporate
liability can deter corporate principals from leading their entities into misbehavior, but
current liability for acts and decisions that contributed to the wrong of slavery is too remote
from the responsible human actors to have any significant deterrent effect on those who
might now be tempted to engage in comparable conduct.
112 See Kull, supra note 21, at 1192-93 (illustrating that restitution applies in many
instances because no other substantive law provides an adequate remedy); see also supra
notes 32-36 and accompanying text (explaining that a claim for restitution does not require
that the defendant committed any wrongful act, but instead merely requires a benefit, that if
retained, would unjustly enrich the defendant).
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ground, legally or morally, for keeping the money.' 13 In any event, there may
be good practical reasons for law to provide outlets for the resentment that
often follows human interactions. Retaliation played a prominent role in
primitive legal systems," l4 and even a mature legal system invites
circumvention if it refuses to accommodate in any way the vengeful elements
in human nature. For all these reasons, claims of unjust enrichment have a
place in private law.
A claim to reparations for slavery illustrates what I have said about unjust
enrichment generally.
A reparations case, on reasonably favorable
assumptions, involves a claim by parties who are not themselves victims of
slavery, but are probably in a better position than any other living persons to
say that gains from slavery were obtained at their expense.' 15 On the other side
are corporate entities that profited from the institution of slavery. 116 The harm
suffered by slaves was certainly wrongful, and the defendant entities may have
participated in the wrong, but these entities are now owned by individuals who
are personally innocent of wrongdoing."l 7 Thus, we have a very significant
harm, but not one suffered by the claimants personally. We have a gain, but
not one that matches to the loss. We have a wrong, but the parties who will
bear the costs of judgment are not wrongdoers.
Compensation is excluded from the analysis by definition. A reparations
claim against corporate entities that participated in or exploited the institution
of slavery might be viewed as a retributive response, motivated by moral
indignation. This characterization, however, assumes that the defendant
corporations bear moral responsibility for the acts of their predecessors in past
centuries."18
Corporate ownership structures make this assumption
113 See Kull, supra note 21, at 1192-93 (discussing the role of restitution in cases that do
not fit within established tort or contract law).
I14 For discussion of the connection between Anglo-Saxon codes and private bloodfeuds, see 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 42-45 (4th ed. 1966); 1
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW:

BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1 46-48 (2d ed. 1923); A. W. B. Simpson, The Laws of
Ethelbert, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 1, 11-13

(1987) (acknowledging the basis of Anglo-Saxon codes on "the institution of the blood
feud"). For analysis of a wide selection of ancient codes, see James Lindgren, Why the
Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L REV. 29, 32-33
(1996).
115 See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1038-39
(N.D. II1.2004) (explaining that the plaintiffs were not directly harmed by the institution of
slavery, but that they represent descendants of those harmed and exploited by slavery).
116 See id. at 1039-41 ("The named defendants... are eighteen present-day companies
whose predecessors are alleged to have been unjustly enriched through profits earned either
directly or indirectly from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and slavery between 1619 and
1865, as well as post-Emancipation slavery through the 1960s.").
117 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 704.
118 See Hampton, Forgiveness,supra note 79, at 56-60 (defining moral indignation as a
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unrealistic.11 9 Moral indignation against a corporate entity, when all the
individuals who owned or controlled the corporation at the time of the wrong
are long dead, is much like moral indignation against a deodand. !20 It may
provide some satisfaction, but it is irrational and should not be encouraged by
law. Thus, neither compensation nor retribution can explain a reparations
claim against the holders of gains derived from slavery.
Like many other restitution claims, the unjust enrichment component of a
reparations claim has a closer affinity to retaliation. The claim is triggered by
122
a serious injury. 121 The claimants are not the primary victims of the injury,
but they claim a personal connection to the victims that could easily bring them
to resent both the injury and anyone who gained at the victims' expense. 123 The
claimants are not seeking to retaliate in the sense of inflicting a corresponding
harm, but they are pursuing a remedy that aims at removing resources from the
defendants' control rather than compensating victims. The sense of injustice is
comparative: the parties who ultimately will pay are not morally blameworthy,
but they possess assets that, in the absence of a wrong, would or at least might
124
have belonged to the claimants.
I have suggested that unjust enrichment serves important purposes in private
law, and that one such purpose is to give vent to the form of resentment likely
to arise when one person gains at another's expense.12 5 A claim for slavery
reparations, however, is not an ordinary private claim. The subject of

"moral anger" targeted at "the wrongdoer's 'immoral cause"' (emphasis added)).
119.See

LARRY

MAY,

SHARING RESPONSIBILITY

84 (1992) (distinguishing between

negligence, which can be attributed to groups, and intentional guilt, which cannot plausibly
be attributed to groups).
120 See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 471-74 (1895) (discussing deodands); see

also William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence(I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1898-1916 (1995) (discussing rat trials in sixteenth century France).
121See, e.g., In re Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1033-38 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (recounting the history of slavery in the United States); First Consolidated and
Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 10-31, In re African-Am. Slave Descendants
Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (MDL No. 1491) (discussing, in detail, the
destructive
history
of
slavery
and
its
consequences),
available at
http://www.aetna.com/legal issues/suits/06-26-03_complaint.pdf (discussing, in detail, the
destructive history of slavery and its consequences).
122 See In re Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1038-39 (acknowledging that

the plaintiffs were all descendants of slaves and were not themselves directly harmed by the
institution of slavery).
123 Retaliation by kin is an ancient phenomenon, reflected, for example, in Anglo-Saxon
law. See 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 114, at 35-38 (discussing the rights of kin); 1
POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 114, at 31 (emphasizing the role and importance of the
family in early Anglo-Saxon society).
124 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 704-06.
125 See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
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reparations is controversial, to say the least. 126 At its core lies the difficult
subject of race. The debate over reparations is public 127 and sometimes
acrimonious.1 28 Opinions on reparations differ radically and are passionately
held. 129 The implications of the controversy are not only national, but also
international as questions arise about who should receive any payments that
ultimately are made. 130 Most importantly, even if a reparations claim can be
fit, for legal purposes, into the mold of a claim by and against individuals, it is
widely viewed as linked to questions about the rights and responsibilities of
groups. 13 1 In a society that seeks to accommodate a plurality of races and

126

A Google search for "slavery" and "reparations" yields nearly 60,000 related

websites. See http://www.google.com/.
127 See, e.g., Millions for Reparations, at http://www.millionsforreparations.com (last
visited Sept. 20, 2004) (announcing a protest in favor of reparations at the United Nations in
September 2003).
121 See, e.g., Reparations for Slavery?
Or Discrimination Against Light-Skinned
Citizens?,
Adversity.Net
News
and
Analysis,
at
http://www.adversity.net/reparations/reparations -for reverse discrimination.htm
(last
visited Sept. 20, 2004) (claiming that proponents of reparations have labeled opponents as
racists and responding by charging proponents with "racial McCarthyism"); Millions for
Reparations,supra note 127.
129 To give just a few brief examples from an enormous literature, Thomas Sowell writes:
The first thing to understand about the issue of reparations for slavery is that no money
is going to be paid. The very people who are demanding reparations know it is not
going to happen. Why then are they demanding something that they know they are not
going to get? Because the demagogues themselves will benefit, even if nobody else
does. Stirring up historic grievances pays off in publicity and votes .... [S]lavery is
not something you apologize for, any more than you apologize for murder. You
apologize for accidentally stepping on someone's toes or for playing your TV too loud
at night. But, if you have ever enslaved anybody, an apology is not going to cut it.
And if you never enslaved anybody, then what are you apologizing for?
Thomas
Sowell,
Reparations for Slavery?,
JEWISH
WORLD
REV.,
at
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell071700.asp
In contrast, Malcolm X is quoted as saying:
The only reason that the present generation of white Americans are in a position of
economic strength ... is because their fathers worked our fathers for over 400 years
with no pay .... We were sold from plantation to plantation like you sell a horse, or a
cow, or a chicken, or a bushel of wheat .... All that money... is what gives the
present generation of American whites the ability to walk around the earth with their
chest out ... like they have some kind of economic ingenuity.
Millionsfor Reparations, supra note 127 (quoting EL-HAJJ MALIK EL SHABAZZ, MALCOLM
X: BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY 123 (1970)).

13o See Rachel L. Swarns, Race Talks Finally Reach Accord On Slavery and Palestinian
Plight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at 1 (describing an accord reached after much debate at
the United Nations' World Conference on Racism, which omitted a call for reparations and
instead recommended debt relief and aid to African countries - the United States left the
conference before the accord was signed).
131 See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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cultures, disputes between constituent groups should be resolved on the highest
ground possible.
Against this background, formal deliberation on the question of reparations
should not be shaped by a legal theory that, by focusing on unjust gains rather
than unjust losses, 132 invites resentment and highlights the retaliatory aspects of
the claim. 133 Assuming that reparations is an appropriate subject for judicial
resolution, the primary attention of all involved should be on injury and
responsibility, not on possession of the fruits of the initial wrong.
CONCLUSION

I have argued that, contrary to common assumptions about the strong moral
foundation of restitution claims, the principle of unjust enrichment draws on
sentiments of resentment that victims feel toward those who have gained at
their expense and it provides a remedy akin to retaliation. I have also
suggested that, as a general matter, the law should provide an outlet for the
type of resentment reflected in restitution claims. The debate over slavery
reparations, however, is too important to American society to be framed or
resolved on this basis. Accordingly, unjust enrichment should be set aside in
arguments over reparations.
Instead, claims to reparations should be
confronted and evaluated as group-based claims to compensation for injuries.

132 See Seavey & Scott, supra note 18, at 32 (explaining that restitution, unlike other

substantive areas of law, focuses primarily on unjust gains received by defendants and not
directly on compensable losses to plaintiffs).
133 See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (discussing the retaliatory nature of
claims for restitution).
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